Branden Fitelson
Curriculum Vitae (03/27/18)
Department of Philosophy & Religion Northeastern University 360 Huntington Avenue 371 Holmes Hall Boston, MA 02115
[email protected] http://fitelson.org/
617.373.3636 (phone) 617.373.4359 (fax) 510.299.8699 (cell)
Personal Information Born: August 17, 1969 in Syracuse, NY
Citizenship: United States
Family: Married to Tina Eliassi–Rad (since 1994), no children.
h-index: 25 | Erdös #: 4
Education •
University of Wisconsin–Madison PhD., Philosophy
1992–2001
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University of Wisconsin–Madison M.A., Philosophy
1992–1997
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University of Wisconsin–Madison B.S., Mathematics & Physics
1988–1992
Academic Positions •
Department of Philosophy & Religion, Northeastern University Distinguished Professor
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Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University Professor
2016– 2013–2016
– Also: Executive Committee, Rutgers Center for Cognitive Science (RuCCS). •
Institute for Logic, Language and Computation, University of Amsterdam Visiting Professor (summer)
2014–2016
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Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, LMU Munich Visiting Professor (summer)
2011–2016
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Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University Associate Professor
2010–2013
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Department of Philosophy, University of California–Berkeley Associate Professor (tenure granted 2007)
2007–2010
– Also: Group in Logic & The Methodology of Science, and Cognitive Science Core Faculty. •
Department of Philosophy, University of California–Berkeley Assistant Professor
2003–2007
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Department of Philosophy, San José State University Assistant Professor
2002–2003
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Department of Philosophy, Stanford University Acting Assistant Professor
2001–2002
Areas of Interest • Epistemology (formal and traditional), Logic (formal, philosophical, computational, and cognitive aspects thereof), Philosophy of Science, Decision Theory, Computing & Philosophy, and Metaphysics
Honors and Awards • Fellow, Center for Advanced Studies (CAS), Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, 2011 & 2012. • Mellon Research Grant, University of California–Berkeley, 2007–2011 • Humanities Research Fellowship, University of California–Berkeley, 2005–2006 • Junior Faculty Research Grant, University of California–Berkeley, 2004–2005 • Best Essay by a Graduate Student: Philosophy of Science Association Contest (2000) • Philosophy of Science Association/NSF Travel Grant (for PSA 2000), October 2000 • Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation Fellowship (UW–Madison), Fall 1998 • Philosophy of Science Association/NSF Travel Grant (for PSA ‘98), October 1998 • The Oliver Prize (for best essay by a graduate student @ UW–Madison), May 1998
Selected Publications Forthcoming: 69. Coherence (book manuscript in progress). 68. Knowledge, Scepticism, and Defeat: Themes from Klein, Rodrigo Borges, Branden Fitelson & Cherie Braden (eds.), Springer, to appear. 67. “Measures of Evidential Support,” to appear in the Routledge Companion to Evidence, Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Trent Dougherty (eds.), Routledge. 2018: 66. “Two Approaches to Belief Revision” (with Ted Shear), Erkenntnis. 65. “Closure, Counter-Closure, and Inferential Knowledge” in Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem, C. de Almeida, R. Borges and P. Klein eds., Oxford University Press. 2017: 64. “Confirmation, Causation, and Simpson’s Paradox,” Episteme. 63. “The Philosophical Significance of Stein’s Paradox,” (with Olav Vassend and Elliott Sober), European Journal for Philosophy of Science. 2016: 62. “Solutions to Some Open Problems from Slaney,” Australasian Journal of Logic. 2015: 61. “A New Garber-Style Solution to the Problem of Old Evidence” (with Stephan Hartmann), Philosophy of Science. 60. “The Strongest Possible Lewisian Triviality Result”, Thought. 59. “Accuracy, Coherence, and Evidence” (with Kenny Easwaran), Oxford Studies in Epistemology (Volume 5), T. Szabo Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds.) Oxford University Press. 58. “Remarks on ‘Random Sequences”’ (with Dan Osherson), Australasian Journal of Logic.
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2014: 57. “A Proposal for Decreasing Geographical Inequality in College Admissions” (with Tina Eliassi-Rad and Danielle Allen), Chapter 12 (Appendix) in The Future of Affirmative Action, J. Renker and J. Miller (eds.), The Century Foundation Press. 56. “Individual Coherence and Group Coherence” (with Rachael Briggs, Fabrizio Cariani and Kenny Easwaran), Essays in Collective Epistemology, J. Lackey (ed.), Oxford University Press. 55. “Declarations of Independence” (with Alan Hájek), Synthese. 2013: 54. “Gibbard’s Collapse Theorem for the Indicative Conditional: An Axiomatic Approach”, in Automated Reasoning and Mathematics: Essays in Memory of William McCune, M.P. Bonacina and M.E. Stickel (eds.), Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNAI Festschrift series), Springer. 2012: 53. “Contrastive Bayesianism,” in Contrastivism in Philosophy, M.J. Blaauw (ed.), Routledge. 52. “An ‘Evidentialist’ Worry About Joyce’s Argument for Probabilism” (with Kenny Easwaran), Dialectica, September 2012. 51. “Updating: Learning versus supposing” (with Jiaying Zhao, Vincenzo Crupi, Katya Tentori, and Dan Osherson), Cognition, September 2012. 50. “Accuracy, Language Dependence, and Joyce’s Argument for Probabilism” Philosophy of Science, January 2012. 49. “Evidence of Evidence is not (necessarily) Evidence”, Analysis, January 2012. 2011: 48. “Favoring, Likelihoodism, and Bayesianism”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Nov. 2011. 47. “Probabilistic Measures of Causal Strength” (with Christopher Hitchcock), Causality in the Sciences, P. Illari, F. Russo and J. Williamson (eds.), Oxford University Press, March 2011. 2010: 46. “The Wason Task(s) and the Paradox of Confirmation” (with Jim Hawthorne), Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 24 (Epistemology), J. Hawthorne and J. Turner, eds., December 2010. 45. “Strengthening the Case for Knowledge from Falsehood”, Analysis, October 2010. 44. “How Bayesian confirmation theory handles the Paradox of the Ravens” (with Jim Hawthorne), in The Place of Probability in Science, E. Eells & J. Fetzer (eds.), Boston Studies in the Phil. of Science, v. 284. 2009: 43. “Pollock on Probability in Epistemology”, Philosophical Studies book symposium for John Pollock’s book Thinking About Acting (OUP, 2006). 42. “What is the ‘Equal Weight View’?” (with David Jehle), Episteme [6(3), 280–293] special issue on disagreement, edited by David Christensen.
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2008: 41. “Bayesians Sometimes Cannot Ignore even Very Implausible Theories (even ones that have not yet been thought of)” (with Neil Thomason), Australasian Journal of Logic (2008) 6: 25–36. 40. “A Decision Procedure for Probability Calculus with Applications”, Review of Symbolic Logic (2008) 1: 11–125. 39. “Goodman’s ‘New Riddle’”, Journal of Philosophical Logic (2008) 37: 613–643. 38. “Probability, Confirmation, and the ‘Conjunction Fallacy’” (with V. Crupi and K. Tentori), Thinking and Reasoning (2008) 14: 182–199. 2007: 37. “Logical Foundations of Evidential Support”, Philosophy of Science 73: 500–512. 36. “Steps Toward a Computational Metaphysics” (with Ed Zalta), Journal of Philosophical Logic (2007) 36: 227–247. 35. “Likelihoodism, Bayesianism, and Relational Confirmation”, Synthese (2007) 156: 473–489. 34. “Relational Confirmation and the Quine–Duhem Problem: A Rejoinder to Strevens” (with A. Waterman), British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (2007) 58: 333–338. 2006: 33. “The Paradox of Confirmation,” Philosophy Compass (online), Blackwell, B. Weatherson (ed.), URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2005.00011.x. 2005: 32. “Bayesianism and Auxiliary Hypotheses Revisited: A Reply to Strevens” (with A. Waterman), British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56: 293–302. 31. Review of Subjective Probability: The Real Thing, by Richard Jeffrey (CUP), Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (online), October 2005, URL: http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=4401. 30. “Probability,” (with A. Hájek and N. Hall) Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia, Routledge, J. Pfeifer & S. Sarkar (eds.), Routledge, 2005. 29. “Inductive Logic,” Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia, J. Pfeifer & S. Sarkar eds., Routledge, 2005. 28. Review of Bayesian Epistemology (Oxford University Press) by L. Bovens and S. Hartmann, Mind 114: 394–400. 2004: 27. “Re-Solving Irrelevant Conjunction with Probabilistic Independence” (with J. Hawthorne), Philosophy of Science, 71: 505–514. 2003: 26. Comments on James Franklin’s ‘Hidden Priors and Bayesian Heuristics’, Law, Probability, and Risk, 2: 201–204. 25. Review of Bayes’s Theorem, edited by Richard Swinburne (OUP), Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (online), November 2003, URL: http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=1307.
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24. Review of An Introduction to Probability and Inductive Logic, by Ian Hacking (Cambridge University Press), Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 9: 506–508. 23. “A Probabilistic Theory of Coherence,” Analysis 63: 194–199. 22. “Monty Hall, Doomsday, and Confirmation,” (with D. Bradley), Analysis 63: 23–31. 21. Review of Interpreting Probability, by David Howie (Cambridge University Press), Philosophy of Science 70: 643–647. 20. Review of The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory, by James Joyce (Cambridge University Press), Mind 112: 545–551. 2002: 19. “Shortest Axiomatizations of Implicational S4 and S5,” (with Z. Ernst, K. Harris, and L. Wos), Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 43: 169–180. 18. “Putting the Irrelevance Back Into the Problem of Irrelevant Conjunction,” Philosophy of Science 69: 611–622. 17. “Symmetries and Asymmetries in Evidential Support” (with E. Eells) Philosophical Studies 107: 129–142. Reprinted in A. Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings, Routledge, 2011. 16. “Vanquishing the XCB Question: The Methodological Discovery of the Last Shortest Single Axiom for the Equivalential Calculus,” (with L. Wos and D. Ulrich), Journal of Automated Reasoning 29: 107-124. 15. “Short Single Axioms for Boolean Algebra” (with W. McCune, R. Veroff, K. Harris, A. Feist, L. Wos), Journal of Automated Reasoning 29: 1–16. 14. “Too Odd (not) to Be True? A Reply to Erik J. Olsson: ‘Corroborating Testimony, Probability and Surprise’,” (with L. Bovens, S. Hartmann, and J. Snyder), British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53: 539–563. 13. “The Automation of Sound Reasoning and Successful Proof Finding” (with L. Wos) in The Blackwell Companion to Philosophical Logic, D. Jacquette, (ed.), Blackwell, 2002. 2001: 12. “A Bayesian Account of Independent Evidence with Applications” Philosophy of Science 68: S123–40. 11. “A Concise Axiomatization of RM→ ” (with Z. Ernst, K. Harris, and L. Wos), Bulletin of the Section of Logic (University of Lodz) 30: 191–194. 10. “Finding Missing Proofs with Automated Reasoning,” (with L. Wos) Studia Logica 68: 329–356. 9. “Distributivity in Łℵ0 and Other Sentential Logics,” (with K. Harris) Journal of Automated Reasoning 27: 141–156. 8. “Comments on Some Completeness Theorems of Urquhart and Méndez & Salto,” (with K. Harris) Journal of Philosophical Logic 30: 51–55. 2000: 7. “Measuring Confirmation and Evidence” (with E. Eells), Journal of Philosophy XCVII: 663–672.
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1999: 6. “The Plurality of Bayesian Measures of Confirmation and the Problem of Measure Sensitivity,” Philosophy of Science 66 (Proceedings): S362–78. 5. “How Not to Detect Design: A Review of William Dembski’s The Design Inference,” (with C. Stephens and E. Sober), Philosophy of Science 66: 472–488. Reprinted in R. Pennock (ed.), Intelligent Design Creationism and its Critics, MIT Press, 2003. 1998: 4. “Plantinga’s Probability Arguments Against Evolutionary Naturalism,” (with E. Sober) Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79: 115–129. Reprinted in R. Pennock (ed.), Intelligent Design Creationism and its Critics, MIT Press, 2003. 3. “Using Mathematica to Understand the Computer Proof of the Robbins Conjecture,” Mathematica in Education and Research 7: 17–26. 1997: 2. “‘Models and Reality,’ Review of Brian Skyrms’s Evolution of the Social Contract,” (with M. Barrett, E. Eells, E. Sober) Philosophy & Phenomenological Research 59: 237–242. 1996: 1. “Wayne, Horwich, and Evidential Diversity,” Philosophy of Science 63: 652-660.
Selected Presentations 70. “Evidence of Evidence: A Higher-Order Perspective” (with Kevin Dorst) • The Significance of Higher-Order Evidence, University of Cologne, September, 2018 • Colloqium on Reasoning in Social Context, University of Amsterdam, June 2018 69. “p is true, but S ought not believe p” • Philosophy Department, Dartmouth College, April 2018 • DEX VI, UC–Davis, March 2018 • 3rd Boulder Workshop in Formal Value Theory, CU–Boulder, March 2018 68. “Knowledge-Centered Epistemic Utility Theory,” (with Julien Dutant) • APA Pacific Division (invited symposium), San Diego, March 2018 • Philosophy Department, Brandeis University, November 2017 • Central States Philosophical Association Annual Meeting, St. Louis, October 2017 • European Society for Analytic Philosophy (ECAP9), Munich, August 2017 • Bled Philosophy Conference, Bled, Slovenia, June 2017 • From Reasonable Doubt to Undue Scepticism, Birkbeck, May 2017 • 2nd Biennial Boulder Workshop on Cognitive Values, CU–Boulder, March 2017 67. “Special Consequences” (with Stephen Yablo) • Philosophy Department, MIT, April 2017 • Philosophy Department, Notre Dame, April 2017 66. “Two Approaches to Doxastic Representation,” Eastern APA, Baltimore, January 2017. 6
65. “Confirmation, Causation, and Simpson’s Paradox” • Causal and Explanatory Reasoning, Venice International University, November, 2017 • Exploring Scientific Method Workshop, Munich, May 2017 • Philosophy Department, MIT, October, 2016 • Episteme Conference, Mpumalanga, South Africa, July 2016 64. “When is Evidence of Evidence Evidence?” • Philosophy Department, University of Cologne, May 2016. • Sawyer Seminar Conference on Expertise and Disagreement, Northwestern, August 2015. 63. “Two Approaches to Belief Revision” (with Ted Shear and Jonathan Weisberg) • Reasoning Club Conference 2017, Turin, May 2017 • Philosophy Department, Rutgers University, February, 2017 • Philosophy Department, University of Pittsburgh, January, 2017 • Conceptions of Belief in Philosophy & Science, University of Regensburg, October 2016 • Formal Epistemology Workshop (FEW 2016), Groningen, June 2016 • Epistemic Utility Theory 2016, Bristol, June 2016 • Philosophy Department, Kansas State, March, 2016 • 4th Colombian Conference on Logic, Epistemology & Phil. of Science, Bogotá, February, 2016 • Philosophy Department, Columbia, December, 2015 • Decision Theory, Epistemology, and the Structure Of Norms, Texas A&M, December, 2015 • Philosophy Department, Toronto, November, 2015 • Philosophy Department, MIT, November, 2015 • 5 th International Conference on Logic, Rationality and Interaction (LORI-V), Taipei, October 2015 • 15 th Congress on Logic, Methodology & Philosophy of Science (CLMPS), Helsinki, August 2015 • Logic & Epistemology Workshop, University of Amsterdam (ILLC), May 2015 • 7 th Workshop on Combining Probability and Logic (PROGIC), Kent, April 2015 • Advanced Logic Seminar, University Of Utah, March 2015 • Probability Workshop, University of Maryland, March 2015 • Morris Colloquium on Cognitive Values, CU–Boulder, March 2015 • Workshop on Full and Partial Belief, University of Tilburg, October 2014 62. “Closure, Counter-Closure and Inferential Knowledge” • Philosophy Faculty, VU University, Amsterdam, May 2015 • Ranch Metaphysics Workshop, White Stallion Ranch, Tucson, January 2015 • Workshop on the Dynamics of Information States, ILLC, University of Amsterdam, June 2014 • Workshop on Knowledge from non-Knowledge, University of Cambridge, May 2014 61. “Two New(ish) Triviality Results for the Indicative Conditional” • Computationally Assisted Mathematical Discovery and Experimental Mathematics (ACMES 2016), Western University, London, Ontario, May, 2016 • Philosophy Department, MIT, April 2016 • Philosophy Department, University of Maryland, April 2016 • Philosophy Department, Kansas State, March, 2016 • Düsseldorf Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science (DCLPS), June 2015 • Logic & Metaphysics Workshop, CUNY Graduate Center, November 2014 7
60. “Epistemic Utility Theory” • Philosophy Department, Arizona State, October 2016 • Philosophy Department, CUNY Graduate Center, October 2015 • Intermountain West Student Philosophy Conference (keynote), University of Utah, March, 2015 • Philosophy Department, UCSB, January 2015 • Philosophy Department, Northeastern University, November 2014 • Philosophy Department, Rutgers University, November 2014 59. “Belief and Credence: The View from Naïve Epistemic Utility Theory” • Symposium on Accuracy-Based Norms for Rational Belief, Eastern APA, December 2014 • Synthese Conference on Qualitative and Quantitative Methods in Formal Epistemology, University of Amsterdam, November 2014 • Workshop on Full and Partial Belief, University of Tilburg, October 2014 • Bridges 2014 (joint MCMP/NYC workshop), New York City, September 2014 58. “Coherence” (book précis) • Proof, Truth & Computation (Summer School), Frauenchiemsee, July 2014 • Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, LMU, July 2014 • The Institute for Logic, Language and Computation, University of Amsterdam, June 2014 • Faculty of Philosophy, University of Cambridge, May 2014 • Philosophy Department, Duke University, May 2014 57. “Individual Coherence and Group Coherence” (with R. Briggs, F. Cariani and K. Easwaran) • Department of Philosophy, University of Michigan, February 2013 • Rutgers Center for Cognitive Science (RuCCS), February 2013 • Seminar on Social Epistemology (Alvin Goldman), Rutgers, February 2012 56. “A General Framework for Grounding Formal Epistemic Coherence Requirements” • New York Philosophical Logic Group, NYU, November 2012 • Groningen/Munich Summer School: Formal methods in philosophy, Groningen, August 2012 55. “Paradoxes of Consistency and (Revising) the Logic of Belief” • Frontiers of Rationality and Decision, Groningen, August 2012 • Paradox and Logical Revision, Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, LMU, July 2012. 54. “Toward an Epistemic Foundation for Comparative Confidence” (with David McCarthy) • An Informal Formal Epistemology Meeting, UW–Madison, April 2014. • Philosophy of Probability Seminar, Venice International University, April 2014. • Inductive logic and confirmation in science, University of Kent, Paris campus, October 2013. • Epistemic Utility Theory 2013, Philosophy Department, University of Bristol, August 2013. • Decisions, Games & Logic 2012, Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, LMU, July 2012. 53. “Accuracy, Coherence and Evidence” (with Kenny Easwaran) • Philosophy Department, Notre Dame, October, 2014 • Philosophy Department, University of Miami, October, 2014 • Philosophy Department, Yale, April, 2014. 8
• Philosophy Department, MIT, February, 2014 • The Moral Sciences Club, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Cambridge, October 2013 • Philosophy Department, Syracuse University, September 2013 • Soberfest, UW–Madison, May 2013 • University of Oklahoma Graduate Philosophy Conference (Keynote), Norman, March 2013 • APA Pacific Division (invited symposium), San Francisco, March 2013 • Epistemic Normativity Group, Rutgers University, February 2013 • Seminar on Belief and Degrees of Belief (Kenny Easwaran), USC, December 2012 • Logic and the Foundations of Game and Decision Theory, Sevilla, June 2012 • Epistemology Above the Arctic Circle, Lofoten Islands, May 2012 • The Institute for Logic, Language and Computation, University of Amsterdam, May 2012 • Philosophy Department, UC–Berkeley, April 2012 • Philosophy Department, CMU, April 2012 • Philosophy Department, Johns Hopkins, March 2012 • Philosophy Department, Arizona, March 2012 • Philosophy Department, UCONN, February 2012 • Philosophy Department, CCNY, December 2011 • Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, June 2011 • Philosophy Department, Northwestern University, May 2011. 52. “An ‘Evidentialist’ Worry About Joyce’s Argument for Probabilism” (with Kenny Easwaran) • XXII Deutscher Kongress für Philosophie, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, September 2011 • Workshop on Belief and Degrees of Belief, University of Stirling, May 2010 51. “Russellian Descriptions & Gibbardian Indicatives: Two Case Studies Involving Automated Reasoning”, Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, June 2011. 50. “Some Remarks on the Model Selection Problem” (with Justin Sharber), Machine Learning Seminar, Computer Science Department, Rutgers University, April 2011. 49. “Favoring, Likelihoodism, and Bayesianism”, American Philosophical Association, Central Division Meetings, Minneapolis, Minnesota, April 2011. 48. “Evidence of Evidence is Not (necessarily) Evidence”, University of Maryland–College Park, Department of Philosophy, March 2011. 47. “Knowledge from Non-Knowledge” • Knowledge, Understanding and Wisdom Conference, Bled, Slovenia, June 2011 • Nature of Knowledge Lecture, University of Edinburgh, March 2011 • Conference in Honor of Richard Feldman (“Feldmania”), UT–San Antonio, February 2011 • Epistemic Transmission and Interaction — NIP-Copenhagen Formal Epistemology Workshop, University of Copenhagen, October 2010 46. “Language Dependence in Philosophy of Science, Inductive Logic, and Social Choice Theory”, presented at DIMACS, Rutgers University, November 2010. 45. “The Problem of Irrelevant Conjunction — Revisited” (with Jim Hawthorne), Center for Formal Epistemology Opening Celebration, Carnegie–Mellon University, June 2010. 44. “Partial Belief, Full Belief, and Accuracy–Dominance” (with Kenny Easwaran), Workshop on Degrees of Belief vs Full Belief, University of Stirling, May 2010 9
43. “What is the ‘Equal Weight View’?” (with David Jehle) • University of Konstanz, November 2009 • 6th Annual Episteme Conference (The Epistemological Significance of Disagreement), Northwestern University, June 2009 42. “Is it rational to have faith? Looking for new evidence, Good’s Theorem, and Risk Aversion”, (with Lara Buchak) invited talk at Formal Perspectives on the Epistemology of Religion, Katholieke Universiteit, Leuven Belgium, June 2009. 41. “Probabilistic Measures of Causal Strength” (with Chris Hitchcock), invited talk at the Second Annual Formal Epistemology Festival (FEF2), University of Michigan–Ann Arbor, May 2009. 40. “Separability, Advice-Giving, and Scoring-Rule–Based Arguments for Probabilism” (with Lara Buchak), invited talk at FEF2, University of Michigan–Ann Arbor, May 2009. 39. “Logic, Epistemology, and The Old Evidence Problem”, Invited Symposium on The Old Evidence Problem, Philosophy of Science Association Meeting (PSA 2008), Pittsburgh, November 2008. 38. “Goodman’s ‘Grue’ Argument in Historical Perspective” • Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, June 2011 • Indiana University, Department of Philosophy, April 2009 • Northwestern University, Department of Philosophy, December 2008 • University of Rochester, Department of Philosophy, December 2008 • Workshop on History, Philosophy, and Sociology of Science (HPSS), Chicago, October 2008 37. “The Wason Task(s) and the Paradox of Confirmation” (with Jim Hawthorne) • Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, June 2011 • University of Chicago, Department of Philosophy, May 2011 • CUNY Graduate Center, Department of Philosophy, May 2011 • University of Edinburgh, Department of Philosophy, March 2011 • University of Aberdeen, Northern Institute of Philosophy (NIP), May 2010 • University of Arizona, Department of Philosophy, April 2010 • University of Wisconsin–Madison, Department of Philosophy, March 2010 • Stanford University, Department of Philosophy, January 2010 • 43rd Chapel Hill Colloquium in Philosophy, University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill, Department of Philosophy, October 2009 • University of California–Berkeley, Working Group in Philosophy of Mind, April 2009 • Rutgers University, Department of Philosophy, April 2009 • Group in Logic and the Methodology of Science, University of California–Berkeley, March 2009 • Indiana University, Department of History and Philosophy of Science, February 2009 • Caltech, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, October 2008 • AI Center, SRI International, October 2008 • Probability, Confirmation and Fallacies, Katholieke Universiteit, Leuven Belgium, April 2008 • Carnegie Mellon University, Department of Philosophy, March 2008. 36. “Epistemological Critiques of ‘Classical’ Logic: Two Case Studies” • Invited Symposium at the Annual Meeting of the British Society for the Philosophy of Science (BSPS 2008), University of St. Andrews, July 2008 • Jowett Society, Oxford University, June 2008 10
• Invited Symposium on Formal Epistemology, Central APA, Chicago, April 2008 • University of Southern California, Department of Philosophy, October 2007 • Reasoning about Probabilities & Probabilistic Reasoning, University of Amsterdam, May 2007 • Why Formal Epistemology? Conference, University of Oklahoma, April 2007 • Mind, Language, Etc. Seminar (organized by Jim Pryor and Hartry Field), Philosophy Department, New York University, March 2007 • Mathematical Methods in Philosophy Workshop, Banff (BIRS), February 2007 • Logic Colloquium, Group in Logic and the Methodology of Science, University of California–Berkeley, February 2007 35. “Argument Diagrams, Bayes Nets, and Independent Evidence,” • Studying Evidence in the Law: Formal, Computational and Philosophical Methods Workshop, 15th International Conference on AI and Law (ICAIL 2015), San Diego, June 2015 • Graphic and Visual Representations of Evidence and Inference in Legal Settings Conference, Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva, January 2007 34. “Likelihoods, Counterfactuals, and Truth-Tracking,” Philosophy of Science Association meetings (PSA 2006), Vancouver, November 2006 33. Comments on Jill North’s “Symmetry and Probability,” Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference (BSPC 2006), Western Washington University, August 2006 32. “Comparative Probability, Comparative Confirmation, and the ‘Conjunction Fallacy”’ (with Vincenzo Crupi and Katya Tentori) • University of California–Merced, Cognitive Science Department, February 2009 • Confirmation, Induction and Science Conference, LSE, March 2007 • Stanford University, Symbolic Systems Program Forum, January 2007 • AI Center, SRI International, November 2006 • Bayesianism, Fundamentally Workshop, University of Pittsburgh, Department of History and Philosophy of Science, October 2006 • Townsend Center Working Group in Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy @ Berkeley, October 2006 • University of California–San Diego, Philosophy Department, September 2006 • Conference in honor of Patrick Suppes, Stanford University, May 2006 31. “Kim on the Unconfirmability of Disjunctive Laws”, Society for Exact Philosophy (SEP 2006), University of California–San Diego, May 2006 30. “Goodman’s ‘New Riddle’” • Studia Logica International Conference, Toru´ n Poland, September 2006 • Caltech, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, May 2006 • Stanford University, Berkeley-Stanford Logic Workshop, May 2006 • Invited symposium at the APA Central 2006, Chicago, April 2006 29. “Confirmation Theory: A Historical Introduction”, Probability Conference, Australian National University (Philosophy RSSS), March 2006 28. “Some Remarks on the ‘Intelligent Design’ Controversy”, First Annual Missouri Philosophy of Religion Conference, University of Missouri–Columbia, Department of Philosophy, January 2006. 27. “Confirmation Theory as a Branch of Inductive Logic: Some Historical and Philosophical Reflections”, invited symposium at the APA Eastern 2005, New York, December 2005. 11
26. “Judgment under Uncertainty Revisited: Probability vs Confirmation” • Princeton University, Princeton Philosophical Society, April 2011 • University of Trento, Department of Cognitive Science and Education, May 2006 • Australian National University, Philosophical Society Colloquium (Philosophy RSSS), March 2006 • Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, CASC, February 2006 • University of Pennsylvania, Institute for Research in Cognitive Science (IRCS), November 2005 25. “Old Evidence, Logical Omniscience, and Bayesianism” • University of Sydney, Department of Philosophy/Centre of Time, March 2006 • University of California–Berkeley, Working Group in the History and Philosophy of Logic, Mathematics, and Science (HPLMS), October 2005 • Epistemic and Probabilistic Updating Workshop, Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC), University of Amsterdam, September 2005 24. “Some Automated Reasoning Techniques for Problems in Non-Classical Modal Logics” • Computing and Philosophy Conference (CAP 2005 @ OSU ), Oregon State University • Argonne Workshop on Automated Reasoning and Deduction, Argonne (ANL), August 2005 23. Comments on Clark Glymour’s “Questions”, presented at the Most Important Unsolved Problems in the Philosophy of Science Conference, UCSB, February 2005. 22. “Relational and Non-Relational Conceptions of Confirmation” • Stanford University, Philosophy Department, April 2009 • Philosophy, Probability, and Modeling Symposium, University of Konstanz, July 2004. 21. “Probabilistic Coherence From a Logical Point of View” and “Some Recent Fallacies of Approximation in Bayesian Confirmation Theory”, Bayesian Epistemology Conference, LSE, June 2004 20. “The Paradox of Confirmation” • Australian National University (Philosophy RSSS), Probability Conference, March 2006 • Stanford University, Logical Methods in the Humanities, February 2006 • University of Missouri–Columbia, Department of Philosophy, January 2006 • University of Pennsylvania, Department of Philosophy, November 2005 • University of California–Davis, Department of Philosophy, October 2004 • University of California–Santa Cruz, Department of Philosophy, September 2004 • Popper Seminar, Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific • Caltech, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, January, 2004 19. “Remarks on the Role of ‘Base Rates’ in Probabilistic Reasoning” • University of California–Berkeley, Institute for Cognitive and Brain Sciences (ICBS), October 2003 • Stanford University, Center for the Study of Language and Information, May 2002 18. “A Decision Procedure for the Probability Calculus, with Applications” • University of California–Berkeley, Department of Statistics, April 2009 • Indiana University, Program in Pure and Applied Logic, February 2009 • University of San Francisco, Computer Science Department, October 2005 • University of Bristol, Meeting of the Luxemburger Zirkel: Logical Methods in Epistemology, Semantics, and Philosophy of Mathematics, January 2005 12
• SRI International, AI Center, November 2004 • University of California–Berkeley, Logic Colloquium, November 2004 • Computing & Philosophy Conference (
[email protected] 2004) CMU, August 2004 • University of Iowa, Computer Science Department, March 2004 • University of California–Irvine, Logic and Philosophy of Science Department (LPS), January 2004 • Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, CASC, October 2003 • American Philosophical Association Pacific Division (APA Pacific 2003), March 2003 • Stanford University, Logical Methods in Humanities, March 2003 17. “Logical Foundations of Evidential Support” • Invited Symposium, Philosophy of Science Association (PSA 2004), Austin, Texas, November 2004 • University of Iowa, Department of Philosophy, March 2004 • University of Michigan, Department of Philosophy, February 2004 • Caltech, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, January, 2004 • University of Oklahoma, Department of Philosophy, October 2003 • University of California–Berkeley, Philosophy Department, February 2003 16. “Steps Toward Computational Metaphysics,” (with Ed Zalta) • European Computing & Philosophy Conference (E-CAP 2004), Pavia Italy, June 2004 • Computing & Philosophy Conference, Oregon State University (
[email protected] 2003), August 2003 15. “Comments on James Franklin’s ‘Hidden Priors and Bayesian Heuristics”’, Inference, Culture, and Ordinary Thinking in Dispute Resolution Conference, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, April, 2003. [Published in Law, Probability, and Risk — item 26 in Publications, above.] 14. “Some Recent Results in Mathematics and Logic, Obtained via Automated Reasoning” • University of California–Berkeley, Group in Logic and the Methodology of Science, March 2003 • Argonne Workshop on Automated Reasoning and Deduction, Argonne (ANL), July 2002 • SRI International, AI Center, October 2001 • Stanford University, Mathematics Department, October 2001 13. “Comments on Kenneth Presting’s ‘Computability and Newcomb’s Problem”’, presented at the American Philosophical Association Pacific Division Meetings (APA Pacific), March 2003. 12. “Three Lectures on Inductive Logic and Bayesian Confirmation,” Summer School on Philosophy and Probability, University of Konstanz, September 2002. 11. “Some Remarks on the Philosophy of Statistics,” Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, CASC, August 2002. 10. “Rethinking the Problem of Old Evidence”: • Stanford University, Symbolic Systems Program Forum, April 2002 • University of Colorado–Boulder, History and Philosophy of Science Colloquium, November, 2001 9. “Comments on Tomoji Shogenji’s ‘The Problem of Independence in Justification by Coherence’,” APA Pacific Division meetings, March 2002. 8. “Some Recent Uses and Misuses of Probability in Philosophy,” Caltech, Science, Ethics & Public Policy Seminar, January 2002.
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7. “Studies in Bayesian Confirmation Theory” • University of California–Santa Barbara, Philosophy Department, January 2003 • University of California–Berkeley, Working Group in the History and Philosophy of Logic, Mathematics, and Science (HPLMS), October 2002 • Yale University, Philosophy Department, January 2001 • Georgetown University, Philosophy Department, January 2001 6. “Putting the Irrelevance Back into the Problem of Irrelevant Conjunction,” History and Philosophy of Science Colloquium, University of Colorado, Boulder, November, 2001. 5. “A Bayesian Account of Independent Evidence with Applications,” Philosophy of Science Association Meetings (PSA 2000) in Vancouver, British Columbia, November 2000. 4. “The Plurality of Bayesian Measures of Confirmation and the Problem of Measure Sensitivity,” Philosophy of Science Association Meeting (PSA ‘98) in Kansas City, Missouri, October 1998. 3. “Comments on Patrick Maher’s ‘Inductive Logic and the Ravens Paradox’,” American Philosophical Association Central Division meetings, Chicago, May 1998. 2. “Plantinga’s Probability Arguments Against Evolutionary Naturalism,” (with Elliott Sober) Naturalism, Theism, and the Scientific Enterprise Conference (NTSE), Austin, Texas, February 1997. 1. “Using Mathematica to Understand the Computer Proof of the Robbins Conjecture,” Mathematica Developer Conference, Champaign, Illinois, October 1997.
Selected Courses Taught Northeastern: • Science & Pseudoscience (Spring 2018) • Advanced Logic (Spring 2017) • Introduction to Logic (Spring 2016, 2017, 2018) MIT: • Seminar on Non-Cognitivism (with Jack Spencer, Fall 2016) Institute for Logic, Language and Computation, University of Amsterdam: • Seminar on Formal Epistemic Coherence Requirements (June 2014) Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München: • Seminar on Formal Epistemic Coherence Requirements (July 2012) Rutgers: • Graduate Seminar on Current Topics in Epistemology (Fall 2014) • Fundamentals of Bayesian Epistemology (Fall 2014) • Graduate Proseminar (with Susanna Schellenberg, Fall 2012; and, with Frankie Egan, Fall 2015) • Introductory Symbolic Logic (Fall 2012 and Fall 2015) • Graduate Seminar on Formal Epistemology (Fall 2011) • Introduction to Formal Reasoning (Fall 2011) • Graduate Seminar on Causation, Counterfactuals, and Scientific Explanation (Spring 2011) • Logic, Reason & Persuasion (Spring 2011) 14
Berkeley: • Graduate Epistemology Seminars (Spring 2010, Spring, 2009, Fall 2007, Fall 2006) • Philosophical Logic (Fall 2008) • Theory of Knowledge (Spring 2007) • Introductory Symbolic Logic (4 semesters) • Probability and Induction (3 semesters) • Metalogic (2 semesters) • Graduate Seminar on Conditionals (Fall 2004) • Graduate Seminar on Scientific Explanation and Scientific Realism (Spring 2004) • Metaphysics (Fall 2003)
Dissertation Supervision/Committees • Inside Member, David Black (Dept. of Philosophy, Rutgers), “Essays on Epistemic Responsibility” (expected 2018). • Inside Member, Daniel Rubio (Dept. of Philosophy, Rutgers), “Essays on Modal Logic & Modal Metaphysics” (expected 2018). • Chair, Will Fleisher (Dept. of Philosophy, Rutgers), “Endorsement and Inquiry” (expected 2018). • Outside Member, Nevin Climenhaga (Dept. of Philosophy, Notre Dame), “Knowledge and Rationality: A Defense of Infallibilist Epistemology” (Spring 2017). • Chair, Ted Shear (Dept. of Philosophy, UC–Davis), “Belief Revision Beyond AGM” (Fall 2017). Currently on a 2-year postdoc at the University of Queensland (starting Spring 2017). • Outside Member, Mostafa Mohajeri (IPM, School of Analytic Philosophy, Tehran, Iran), “Newcomb Problems: Decision Problems or Pseudo-Decision Problems” (Spring 2016). • Outside Member, Kit Patrick (Dept. of Philosophy, Univ. of Bristol), “Epistemic Virtues” (Spring 2015). • Chair, Justin Sharber (Dept. of Philosophy, Rutgers), “The Predictive Focus Account of the Principle Of Simplicity” (Fall 2014). • Chair, Ben Levinstein (Dept. of Philosophy, Rutgers), “Accuracy as Epistemic Utility” (Spring 2013). Currently Assistant Professor, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. • Inside Member, Fabrizio Cariani (Group in Logic and the Methodology of Science, UC–Berkeley), “Rethinking the Semantics of ‘Ought’ and the Unity of Modal Discourse” (Spring 2009). Currently Associate Professor of Philosophy at Northwestern University. • Chair, Galen Huntington (Group in Logic and the Methodology of Science, UC–Berkeley), “Toward an Efficient Decision Procedure for the Existential Theory of the Reals” (Fall 2008). • Chair, Kenny Easwaran (Group in Logic and the Methodology of Science, UC–Berkeley), “The Foundations of Conditional Probability” (Spring 2008). Currently Associate Professor of Philosophy at Texas A&M University. • Chair, Michael Titelbaum (Department of Philosophy, UC–Berkeley), “Quitting Certainties: A Doxastic Modeling Framework” (Spring 2008). Currently Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin–Madison. • Outside Member, Darren Bradley (Philosophy Department, Stanford University), “Bayesianism and Self-Locating Beliefs or Tom Bayes Meets John Perry” (Spring 2007). Currently Senior Lecturer in Theoretical Philosophy at the University of Leeds.
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Selected Professional Service • Member of the Editorial Board of Mind, 2015– • Member of the Editorial Board of Semantics & Pragmatics, 2015– • Co–Editor, Journal of Philosophical Logic (2011–2013) • Associate Editor, Episteme (2011–2013) • Subject Editor, Formal Epistemology, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2007–2013) • Member of the Editorial Board of Journal of Philosophical Logic (2008–2011) • Member of the Editorial Board of Studia Logica (2005–2010) • Editor of two special issues on Formal Epistemology for Studia Logica (2005–2007) • Co-Editor of a special issue on Confirmation & Reasoning Fallacies for Synthese (2008–2009) • Editor of a special issue on Formal Epistemology for the Journal of Philosophical Logic (2009–2010) • Co-Editor of a special issue on Formal Epistemology for Erkenntnis (2012–2013) • Co-Editor of Themes From Klein (a Festschrift for Peter Klein), Springer, to appear in 2018 • Co-Organizer of the PIKSI-Logic Summer School, Northeastern University, July 2018 • Co-Organizer of the Bochum Epistemology Seminar, Ruhr University, June 2018 • Co-Organizer of the annual Formal Epistemology Workshops (FEW 2004–FEW 2013) • Co-Organizer of Bayesianism, Fundamentally conference, Pitt/HPS, October 2006 • Co-Organizer of Confirmation, Induction and Science conference, LSE, March 2007 • Co-Organizer of North American Computing & Philosophy (NA–CAP) Conferences (2005–2009) • Member of the Program Committee for the European Congress for Analytic Philosophy (ECAP9) (2017) • Member of the Program Committee for Formal Epistemology Meets Experimental Philosophy (2011) • Member of the Program Committee for the Pacific Division APA Meetings (2005–2009) • Member of the Program Committee for PSA 2006 & 2010 (Philosophy of Science Association) • Member of the Program Committee for EPSA 2009 (European Philosophy of Science Association) • Member of the APA Committee on Philosophy and Computers (2005–2010) • Member of the PIKSI-Boston Board (2016–)
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